RECENT CASES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Tie'Supreme Cui't of the United States, in Continental
1VI Paper Company v. I'oight and Sons Company, 29 Supreme Court Reporter, 280, decided that a con-: bination, illegal under the Sherman Anti-Trust
nat.n
Act, cannot collect a debt arising out of a conCnacuf
tract made with one of its constituents.
(For a full discussion of the principles involved see note,
P. 459, of this issue.)
The Code of Alabama renders it a criminal act for a laborer,
who enters into a contract for labor and thereby obtains money,
to refuse to carry out the contract. In Alonzo
tracts
Bailey v. Alabama, 29 Supreme Court Reporter,
141, the United States Supreire Court refused to
take jurisdiction of the case because it was prematurely appealed. The case is now pending, after a final conviction, before the Supreme Court of Alabama.
(For a full discussion see note, p. 464, of this issue.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Missouri Railroad Company v. Larabee Flour Company, 211 U. S. 627, sus-

tained the power of the State courts to enforce
Commerce,
by mandamus the common law duty of a carrier
State Courts not to discriminate in supplying cars for interstate shipments at an established station.
(For a full discussion see note, p. 475, of this issue.)
The State of Texas in 1889 and in 19o3 passed laws known
as the anti-trust laws whereby it became unlawful to combine
to create, or to do acts which tended to create,
of Permtttodo or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce, or
Intrastate
to fix, maintain or increase the prices, or to preBusiness
vent or lessen competition, etc. The appellant
had entered into certain contracts with other corporations and
individuals for the purpose of suppressing competition and

monopolizing the trade, but these contracts had been entered
(480)
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into before the passage of these anti-trust laws by a predecessor of the appellant, and the appellant in stepping into the
shoes of this predecessor had assumed these contracts and
carried them out after the passage of the laws. The Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas, sustained the lower court which
had assessed a fine of $i,623,5oo and which had also ordered
the appellant's permit for doing business in the state to be
cancelled, in accordance with the penalties provided in the
statutes. The Court also appointed a receiver to take charge
of all the property of the corporation which was located in
Texas. The case was taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States, where the decision of the state court was
affirmed. It was decided that the laws were not retroactive
in effect because they applied to contracts which were carried
out after their passage, although the contracts had been entered into before; also, that the fines were not excessive in
view of the fact that the property of the company amounted
to over forty million dollars; and lastly, that the laws were
not unconstitutional. Pierce Oil Co. v. State of Texas, 29
Sup. Ct 220.
The case is interesting as upholding the constitutionality of
laws which may drive a corporation out of business within
the limits of a state as far as intrastate business is concerned,
and is further of interest in the method employed for the
purpose, namely, the appointment of a receiver who can take
over all the property within the state.
CRIMINAL LAW.
On a recent indictment for murder in Texas, the facts were
that B and C were in a house with the door closed. A shot
through the door and killed C. Held, (i) that
First Dosr.
murders

if A intended to shoot B and by mistake shot C,

-xpress Mal- it was only murder in the second degree cven

ice

Against
tltinudtvldualt-

though it would have been murder in the first

degree had he killed B, and (2) that an intentional shooting into a house for the purpose of
killing an inmate is burglary. Holland v. State, i15 S. W. 48.
I. This decision brings up a difference in the statutory
requisites of murder in the first degree in the several states
which is often overlooked. In the majority of jurisdictions
the statutes provide that all murder perpetrated by means of
poison, or lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or in the perpetration of
Burglary
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arsox, rape, robbery, or burglary, .hall be murder in the first
degree, and under such statutes express malice against the
deceased is not required. Comm v. Breyessee, i6o Pa. 451,
(1894); State v. Payton, 9o Mo. 22o, (x886).
The Texas statute however substitutes express malice in
the place of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, and

the decision therefore is undoubtedly sound. McCoy v. State,

25 Tex. 33; 4ke v. State, 30 Tex. 466, (1867).
II. The conclusion that an intentional shooting into a house
for the purpose of killing an inmate is burglary seems sound
on principle (Bishop on Criminal Law, II, § 94), for the entry
of the bullet is intended to accomplish a felony; but the authorities are 'uncertain on the question. x Hale, P. C.555; I
Hawk, P. C. 132; 2 East, P. C. 49o.

EASEMENTS.
Where a private way ex necessitate exists for the benefit
of leasehold premises and where there was some evidence
that the plaintiff had, previous to the time in
question, been visiting the tenant periodically for
ISVlt"

the purpose of collecting from him, as they fell

due, installments on the purchase price of furniture bought

by the tenant, the question arose whether on the time in ques-

tion he had the right to use the said way for the same pur-

pose. It was held inter alia (x) that such previous use by
the plaintiff, in connection with the contract made, might
afford an inference that the plaintiff was authorized by the

tenant to visit him for that purpose;

(2)

that the mere de-

sire of the plaintiff to go to the house of the tenant to collect
a bill would not be either legal cause or good excuse for so
doing. Tutweiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co. v. Tuvin, 48 So. 79

(AL., xgo8).
A right of way, appendant or annexed to, an estate, may
be used and enjoyed by those who own or lawfully occupy
any part of the dominant tenement for any purpose to which
it may from time to time be legitimately applied. Only those
who may be properly regarded as trespassers on the domihant estate can be excluded. Gunson v. Healy, zoo Pa. 42,

(1882).
-

The enjoyment of a way of necessity is ordinarily limited

only by the necessity for its use in connection with all lawful

uses of the land to which it is appurtenant. Whittier v. Winkley, et al., 62 N. H. 338 (1882).
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All persons having occasion may, with the permission of
the owner of the way, transact business with him bypassing
to and fro Over the way. Shreve v. Mathis. 63 N. J. Eq. 171 ,

p. 178

(1902).

The existence of an implied license by the tenant is a question of fact for the determination of the jury. Knowles v.
Dow, 2 Foster, 387 (N. H. i85y); Walter v. Post, 13 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 363; 4 Abb. Prac. Rep. 382, p. 388 (1857). For
an extreme case in which the evidence was held sufficient
to support an inference that the plaintiff was a business visitor on the land, see Thornton v. Maine State Agricultural
Society, 53 At]. Rep. 979 (Me., 19oz).
EQUITY.
The jurisdiction of Equity to restrain trespass by municipal
and other corporations upon private property has always been
recognized. Most of the illustrations -of this
power, beginning with the early one of Hughes
Tresrass
v. Trustees of Modern College, 1 Vesey, Sr. Rep.
188, have been cases in which officials were restrained from
actual physical appropriation of the plaintiff's property, either
because they were exceeding their powers, or the statute authorizing the taking was unconstitutional. Belknap v. Belknap,
2 Johns. Ch. 463; McArthur v. Kelly, 5 Ohio, 139. Within
recent years, however, new conditions have arisen and cases
of trespass have called for equity jurisdiction, though no
attempt was made to appropriate permanently the plaintiff's
land. The clearest instance of this state of facts is to be
found in the continued interference by police in private activities. Practically all the cases have arisen in New York, and
the question seems not entirely settled. It has been met only
once in the Court of Apepals in the case of Delaney v. Flood,
183 N. Y. 323, which case is unfortunately not conclusive
as its decision has been interpreted in two opposite ways by
the lower courts in later decisions. On the one hand it has
been held that Delaney v. Flood must be decided strictly on
its facts, and that its refusal to grant an injunction arose
from the language of the statute governing Raines Law Hotels,
and other quasi-illegal resorts that were required to hold a
license. Hale v. Burns, OI App. Div. zoz; McGorie v.
McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 271, etc
On the other hand a
number of cases have held that the Delaney case rejected the
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idea of equity interference in trespass of this kind, and that
plaintiff's remedy was strictly at law. Eden Musee Co. v.
Bingham, 12 5 App. Div. 78o; Olympic Athletic Club v. Bingham, 125 App. 793; Stevens v. McAdoo, 112 App. Div. 458.
It will thus be seen that the various appellate courts have
differed in their reading of the original case.
The latest decision on the subject has come from the Supreme Court. In this case the Fairmont Athletic Club maintained sparring exhibitions which they claimed were free and
for their members alone. The police authorities however
charged that an admission, &c., was taken and that the exhibitions were for the public. They therefore without warrants for arrest, stationed officers in the club-house at every
exhibition and every business meeting, until the club, in order
to obtain relief sued in equity. The Court granted the desired injunction on the grounds of (i) irreparable damage; (2)
multiplicity of suits; and (3) the impossibility of estimating
damages in an action at law. Fairmont Club v. Bingham,
113 N. Y. Supp. 905.

The decision stands dearly for the proposition that Delaney
v. Flood (supra) applied only to the particular facts in that
case. It also differentiates the cases holding the opposite view
by the statement that in those cases no trespass was threatened, and that the act sought to be restrained was the making
oi an arrest in a lawful manner. It seems difficult to accept
this interpretation of the matter, since the facts of the case
in hand are exactly parallel to those differentiated, and since,
finally, the language of the late case of Suesskind v. Bingham,
125 App. Div. 787, seems utterly incompatible with such interpretation. There is no question, however, that the majority of
Appellate Court cases indicate a tendency to take jurisdiction
under such a state of facts as this; and the present case, representing as it does the view of one of the higher courts, is
probably an indication of the view that will be taken of the
matter when it is finally decided, as it undoubtedly must be
by the Court of Appeals.
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WVhere property was left to B on a parol trust for A; and
A was also heir of testator,. and hence the cestui que trust of
Paral Trusts
statute of

Praud

either the express or, if the express trust failed,
a resblting trust, the Statute of Frauds was
thought to be of no avail. Ballinger v. Ballinger,

99 Pac. 196 (California).

(For a further discussion see note, p. 468, of this issue.)

EVIDENCE.
In a prosecution for assault and battery the Supreme Court
of Mississippi held that the district attorney's comment on
the failure of the prisoner to put his wife on
COV.lent on the stand as a witness, if he wanted the circumFie-e toCall stances of the trouble investigated, as the State
wate.
could not have made her a witness, was reversible error. Johnson v. State, 47 Southern, 897.
At common law a wife or husband could not, except in
a few cases, testify either for or against each other, and where
this rule is still in force it is obviously error to allow the
prosecution to comment on the absence of such witness
Graves v. U. S., i5o U. S. nS, (893).
In most jurisdictions, however, it is provided by statute
that a wife or husband may be called by the prisoner. In
England comment by the prosecution .on the failure to produce such a witness is forbidden (6t, 62 Vict., C 36, sec. x),
and in Mississippi, though there is no such provision in the
statute (Code of 19o6, § 1916), the law is well settled, in
accord with the case under discussion, that such comment is
reversible error. Johnson v. State, 63 Miss. 313 (1885); Cole
v. State, 75 Miss. 142 (897).

In Pennsylvania the rule is contra (Comm. v. Weber, x6"7
Pa. 153, i895), and the question reduces itself to whether the
general unfavorable inference drawn from the failure to produce available evidence must in this instance vanish, as being
inconsistent with the full exercise of the defendantes privilege
to call his wife or not as he sees fit. This question, which is
closely analagous to the privilege against self incrimination
provided for by statute in almost all jurisdictions, has usually been answered in the affirmative, it being held that the
allowance of such an inference would amount to a destruction of the privilege, and that "the law, in permitting husbands and wives to testify on behalf of each other, cannot
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have contemplated that any moral coercion should enable
others to force them into the witness box." Knowles v.
People, 15 Mich. 408, 413 (1867). However, as pointed out
by Mr. Wigznore (Evidence, § 2243), "whether this conclusion is inevitable is at least open to argument. The argument
against it is that there is no actual coercion and no actual denial of the privilege, but merely a dilemma and an option,
which are created not by any direct attempt to break into
the privilege, but by the accidental coincidence, upon the same
piece of testimony, of two independent principles of law,
neither one of which should be made to yield rather than the
other."
Appellant was convicted of killing a horse by poison. Exceptions were taken to the admission of evidence of the death,
Admlsslbiflty a short time previous of two other horses beOf PastSirnilar longing to the prosecutor. Held, where the eviOffences
dence of another offense proves an element of
the one for which he is on trial, or the motive for committing the acts constituting the crime charged, and such independent offences in connection with the one charged, were
committed by the accused for some particular purpose which
he' intended to accomplish, such evidence is admissible.
Jaynes v. People, 99 Pac. 325 (Colorado).
The general rule is that evidence of previous crimes is
not admissible to prove a given crime, and the Court recognizes this rule in making the above exception. There are,
however, three purposes for which such evidence is admissible: first, to prove knowledge; second, to prove intent, the
act being admitted; third, to prove design. Under the facts
of the case at bar the evidence could not have been admitted
to show a knowledge of the poisonous nature of the drug, as
in R. v. Dossett, 2 C. & K. 307, for it only appeared that the
horses had been poisoned, and not that the prisoner had done
the poisoning. Since by statute, however, it was necessary
for the act to be wilful, the evidence would have been admissible as tending to negative the hypothesis of accident, even
though the prisoner had not yet been connected with the former poisoning; for this would fall under the doctrine of
"anonymous intent" as in R. v. Flannagan, 15 Cox Cr. 403.
And finally the evidence unquestionably would have been ad-
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missible to show a general design to injure the prosecutor,
since the former poisonings formed parts of a chain of acts
to "get even" with the prosecutor (as elsewhere testified).
The leading case sustaining this position is Commonwealth
v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571.
On appeal from a conviction for robbery, the Court held:
The possession of stolen property shortly after the commisof the offense is prima facie evidence of
Presumpldons: siontAfe*
Posiession of gult. After its introduction the burden of proof
stolen
does not shift to the defendant. Such evidence

authorizes but does not require a conviction.
People v. Deluce (Il.), 86 N. E. zo8o (19o9).
The opinion of the Court is a very clear statement of the
law, on a confused and much mooted question. In speaking
of the possession of stolen property the language of presumptions has been much used, and it has, in many instances, been
difficult to determine the exact meaning of such expressions
as "prima facie evidence of guilt," or "presumptive. evidence
of guilt." As used in some cases the meaning appears to be
that the burden of proof is shifted, and that if this burden
is not satisfied a conviction must follow. State v. Kelly, 50
La. Ann. 597. Roscoe's Crim. Evid. (12th Ed.), 19. Most
cases, however, seem to repudiate a rule of presumption in
so strict a sense, and lay down the doctrine that the fact of
possession of stolen property is evidence on which the jury
may convict, but that its weight and effect is always a question of fact for them. Reg. v. Exall, 4 F. & F. 922; Miller
v. People, 229 I11. 376.
Stated in terms of burden of proof this rule amounts to
this: When the prosecution has proved the possession of
stolen property shortly after the offense, the burden of introducing evidence is satisfied and the case can go to the jury.
The burden of proof has not shifted, however, in the sense
of that expression, that the party introducing the evidence
must succeed in the event of no further evidence being introduced on the other side.
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Unsympathetic critics have censured the judiciary for a
certain clumsiness in their literary expression. They charge
Relevanc':
the bench with an almost meticulous regard for
CondtMo o
accuracy, in the pursuit of which laudable though
Propt',
mundane, object, a judge will spare neither his
vocabulary nor his readers. As a consequence the perusal of
a Supreme Court opinion is exhausting to the reader's mind,
since it puts each fact forward with severe accuracy, and contains none of that haunting allusion and suggestiveness that
make the pages of Pater and Meredith so fascinating to the
lovers of educative literature. It is unfortunately true that
most judicial opinions leave little for the reader to imagine;
but it is refreshing to record that the failing is not universal. A recent Alabama decision has so stated the facts of the
case that after a certain amount of study one may still interpret them in several ways; and has complimented possible
readers by supposing they are aware of various circumstances
that alas they know not of. Home Ice Co. v. Howells Mining
Co., 148 So. n17.
The facts of the case were briefly these: The Mining concern sued the Ice company as purchaser of a lot of coal. The
defendant pleaded that the quality of the coal was so equivocal as not to cover the freightage defendant had agreed to
pay, and the actual value of the coal was thus put in issue.
The judge of the lower Court instructed a finding for the
plaintiff if the defendant bought "run of mine" coal, notwithstanding it may not have been the best quality of coal
as set up in the special pleas; and judgment was given for
the plaintiff. Certain evidence was excluded by the judge,
and defendant assigned this as one of his grounds of appeal.
Jn regard to this matter the Court uses the following language:
"The quality of the coal was an issue in the case, and the
witness, Boseman, testified as to the coal used by him for the
Pure Milk Co., some of which was returned to defendant.
It is true that it was not a part of the coal involved, but if it
was exactly the same kind of coal, the defendant should have
been permitted to prove this fact, as this proof would have
rendered the testimony of Boseman of some value as to quality, etc."
Wc are unfortunately not in the confidence of the Court
as to the identity of Boseman and the Pure Milk Co., nor do
we know where the latter bought the coal, or from whom.
It was returned to the defendant, and it is possible to imag-

RECENT

CASES

EVIDENCE (Continued).
ine the Ice company as a retail dealer in coal, and as having
sold part of the coal in question to the dairy in question, though
other evidence would tend to show that all the worthless
coal was used by defendant, presumably to get it out of the
way. If the coal purchased by the Milk company had come
from the same lot or car as defendant's, testimony as to its
value would be relevant. Greenleaf: Evidence, 52. If on
the other hand, it could merely be shown that the coal was
purchased from the same vendor, the fact would seem irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury, unless it could be proved
conclusively to have been of exactly the same quality as the
coal in question. Preston v. Dunham, 52 Ala. 217.
The present case is not unlike that of Holcomb v. Hewson,
2 Camb. 391, in which a brewer tried to prove the good
quality of the beer sold to the defendant by witnesses who
testified that the beer they had bought from the same brewer
was good; and the evidence was held to be irrelevant. The
probable meaning of the language used in the present case is
.that the cnal used by the Milk Company was either part of
the lot sold to the defendant, or, what is more probable, coal
of exactly the same quality, or from the same car or heap.
If so, the statement that evidence tending to show the value
of exactly the same kind of coal, was dearly in line with the
authorities and decisions. Preston v. Dunham, 52 Ala. 217;
Denver Co. v. Reynolds, 72 Fed. 464.
Defendant was convicted of the murder in the second degree of one Swearingen. He admitted stabbing deceased
while both were in deceased's field. Deceased's
R" Q~t
ayo
D-ldwife was permitted to testify, inter alia, that on
ratleUS
the day her husband was killed she was at home
sweeping; that the first information she had of her husband's
being hurt was when she heard him holloa; that she recog-

nized his voice and started for the door, before reaching which

she heard him again; that she ran down to the field, and saw

deceased coming toward the house and defendant going toward his house; that she got to the gate which was about

fifty yards from where deceased had been plowing; that dcceased in answer to- her inquiry as to what was the matter,
said "Oh Bill has cut me." The deceased then made to his

wife further statements concerning the stabbing.
The evidence further showed that deceased was bleeding

a good deal and in a few minutes complained of being sick
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and then became cold. He lay down and asked for his father
-and brothers saying that he wanted to tell them goad-by,
and died in a few minutes thereafter.
The Court held (i) that this was a narration of a past
transaction and not a part of the res gestae; (2) that whether
declarations were made under a sense of impending death is
a preliminary question of fact for the trial Judge and his finding will not be overturned where there is evidence to support
it. Jones v. State (Ark.), n 5 S. W. 166 (i9o9).
There are two views (i) that only such declarations are
admissible as grow out of the principal fact or transaction,
illustrate its character, are contemporary with it and derive
some degree of credit from it. [Lund v. T3nborough, 9

Cush. (Mass.) 36 (1857), p.

42]; (2)

that any statement

though narrative of a past recurrence is admissible if made
while the immediate results of such occurrence are still apparent and so soon after as to be made under the overpowering
influence of it and so practically without an opportunity for
invention. Coin. v. Wert;, x6 Pa. 591 (1894). See also
article on Res Gestae, by Mr. Francis H. Bohlen, 51 Am.

Law Reg. x87.
The earlier Arkansas cases seem to favor the second view.
Railway Co. v. Leverett, 48 Ark. 333 (1886) ; Ft. Smith Oil Co.
v. Slover, 58 Ark. ,68, p. ,8o (1893).
It is not necessary that declarant state at the time he makes
the declaration that he does so under the sense of impending
death, but such apprehension may be shown from the surrounding circumstances such as his evident danger, etc. Newberry v. State, 68 Ark. 355, P. 357 (19oo).
LIBEL
In the case of Tanner v. Embree, 99 Pac. 547, the Supreme
Court of California held, that a newspaper editor stands in no
better position than any other member of the
community, so far as claiming privilege to pubtu
OL:
PUblcCbrn- lish statements of a defamatory character about a
candidate for office is concerned.
(For a full discussion see note, p. 469, of this issue.)

RECENT CASES

NEGLIGENCE.
In the case of Lyttle v. Denny, 222 Pa. 395, the plaintiff
was a guest at the defendant's hotel and was injured by the
collapse of the folding bed in which he was sleepLiability of
ing. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony
InkeerCaused
for
the trial Judge entered judgment of compulsory
Injury
to Guesty
non-suit because plaintiff had not shown what
Collapse
t
Folding-bed
was wrong with the bed and the reason for its
falling. From the judgment of non-suit plaintiff
appealed. Held, that the facts in this case show a prima facie
case of negligence upon the part of the defendant sufficient
to go to the jury, and the inference of negligence must stand
until overthrown by countervailing proof. Folding-beds do
not collapse when they are in proper condition, and if the bed
was not in proper condition that is evidence of negligence and
the burden is then upon the defendant to show no negligence.
This case comes within the rnle laid down in Scott v. London Docks, 3 Hurlst & C. 596, where the principle is stated
as follows, "Where the thing is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants that the accident arose from want of care." The duty of
an innkeeper to his guests is to see to it that care is taken
to make premises safe. This duty is not satisfied by the mere
exercise of personal care on the part of defendant, but he
must see to it that anyone to whom he intrusts the work uses
reasonable care. The degree of care has in some cases been
declared equal to that of a common carrier of 1passengers but
this view is not now generally accepted as law. The common
carrier must use greatest possible care because of the dangers
of his business, but the innkeeper's business not being fraught
with such dangers he is only required to use ordinary care.
Beale on Innkeepers, § 162-x66.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Under an indictment for forgery, it was proved that defendant delivered a forged check with the name of the payee
blank, in payment for a piano. The defense was
BlaOk Namel raised that, on account of the incompleteness of
No V
the instrument, it was not a check within the
.tso.ta
meaning of the California code. In answer to
this defense the Court held that defendant's delivery of the incomplcte paper carried with it an implied authority to fill it up, that the exercise of that authority dated
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back to the time of delivery, and that therefore the delivery
of the blank instrument constituted the crime charged. People
v. Graham (Cal.), 99 Pac. 391.
The Negotiable Instruments Law has not been enacted in
California, and the above decision undoubtedly represents the
American view of the subject before the passage of that Act.
Overton v. Matthews, 35 Ark. 136; Breckenridge v. Lewis,
84 Me. 349; Rich v. Starbuck, 51 Ind. 87. This doctrine was
based on the decision of Lord Mansfield, in Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514. That case, however, was apparently not
followed in England (Awde v. Dixon, 6 Exch. 869; Hatch
v. Searles, 2 Small & G. 147), and the recognized rule before
the Bills of Exchange Act was that one who took incomplete
paper had only a prima fade authority to fill it up, and that
the limits of such authority could be shown by the maker,
except as against a bona filde holder for value without notice

of the incompleteness.

This rule was not changed by the

Bills of Exchange Act. Smith v. Prosser,L. R. 1907, 2 IC B.
735.
In the United States the same rule now exists under the
Negotiable Instrument Law, which has been construed as
changing the law on this subject as laid down in the previous
decisions. Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Va. L. Reg. 639; Boston
Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer, 183 Mass. i4o. As a result the
law under the Negotiable Instruments Act is that one who
takes incomplete paper is put upon inquiry as to the authority
of the person entrusted with the incomplete instrument.
PLEADING.
The Supreme Court of Vermont, in Barre Granite Co. v.
Fraser,7i Atlantic, 828, held that although B assigned a conRight of As.
tract with A to C, and A subsequently promised
to Sue to pay C, if C performed, C had not the right to
signt
sue in his own name for the sum due.
(For a full discussion see note, p. 472, of this issue.)
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SALES.
Plaintiff sold machinery to one H on credit, title to remain
in the plaintiff till payment; a bill of lading was made out to
Veador's Etop plAgeiast

H, c/o defendant.

The defendant bought from

H for value, and had the machinery installed,
S-b-v~ide.
being ignorant of the conditions of the sale. The
plaintiff proved his claim as a creditor of H who had become
bankrupt, and received payments on this claim, but now seeks
to hold defendant for conversion. Held, plaintiff is bound by
his election to sue H, for the contract price. Furthermore
since the machinery was consigned to H who was engaged
in the business of furnishing and installing uch machinery on
lands of others, and nothing indicated that title had been reserved by consignor, who knew that the machinery was to be
installed for defendant, and become permanently affixed to
his land, plaintiff cannot recover from defendant, a purchaser
for value without notice. American Process Co. v. Florida
Brick Co., 47 South. 942 (Fla.).
The Court decided the case chiefly on the fact that the
plaintiff was barred in this suit by his previous election of
remedies; but the estoppel of the vendor brings up an interesting distinction in the law of sales. Mere possession by a
conditional vendee, is never considered as sufficient to estop
the vendor, even against a purchaser for value without notice.
Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N. J. L. 41o; but the doctrine
has long been established that in case of possession by one
whose common business it is to sell, without any' limitation
having been put on his authority, a bona fide purchaser will
be protected. Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38. And this is
also true where the goods were bought only to be resold.
Mechem on Sales, Vol. I, p. 6oi. In the case at bar the Court
introduced still another element to fortify the position of the
defendant, namely, the fact that the vendor knew that the
article was to be affixed to the sub-vendee's land. This fact
as a ground of estoppel comes more properly under the law
of fixtures, and though the Court cited no case in support of
the proposition, yet the case of Jenks v. Co well, 66 Mich. 42o,
is a direct authority.
A entered into a contract with B for the sale of lumber to
the latter. The terms of the contract arranged for shipment
in instalments, each instalment to be met by ven"c ec-trct¢
dee's note at sixty days. Several loads were
shipped as per contract; then the shipments became tardy, and B constantly notified A to ship him the lum-
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her. It appears from the uncontroverted evidence, however,
that the initial breach was made by the vendee in falling behind
in his payments for the purpose of seeing whether A would
ship all the lumber; and- that further shipments had been purposely withheld by A until those payments should be met. A
now sues B for the balance due on lumber shipped; B pleads
never indebted, but that A was indebted to him for the lumber withheld, the value of which had since risen. The Court in
finding for the vendor, A, held that if he had not performed
his contract as promptly as required, and refused to ship any
more lumber under it, B. the vendee, could have abandoned
it and sued for damages for the breach, but that he could
not stand on the contract and insist on further shipments,
when he was in default in making payments that were past
due under it, at least without tendering these payments. Harris Lumber Co. v. Wheeler Co., i15 S. W. i68.
The decision here is in harmony with those of similar
cases. See Nichols v. Scranton, 137 N. Y. 471 ; .King v.
Paist, 161 Mass. 449. In Rugg v. Moore, i io Pa. 242, in
which the facts were identical with those of the case in hand
the Court arrived at precisely the same conclusion in this
language: "He (the plaintiff) paid the first draft and refused
to pay the second draft, because be wanted to see whether
defendants had shipped or would ship all the corn. This was
not a sufficient reason for refusing to pay after he had accepted and received the corn. If then, the contract required
payments on deliveries, and plaintiff wilfully"refused payment,
according to the contract, he thereby authorized defendants
to rescind at their option."
Perhaps the most concise statement of the law as applied to
this case may be found in the following extract:
"If the breach of condition of part payment is the result of
accident or oversight, or is attended by other facts and circumstances which are inconsistent with an intention to aban'on the contract, and which incline one to presume that the
buyer intended to fully perform this contract, then the failure
to pay an instalment at the agreed time does not work a forfeiture of the whole contract, but by tender of the future
inclalments of payments he may claim the benefits of the sale.
But if the acts of the buyer in failing to make the payment
(if an instalment, clearly indicate his intention to abandon the
co tract, as where the refusal to pay is wilful, and not through
a misunderstanding or accident, the entire contract is to be

RECENT CASES

SALES (Continued).
forfeited, and the seller cannot thereafter be compelled to
perfonn the contract." Tiedemann on Sales, 210.
Here the failure to pay as admitted by B was not aceidental but intentional, as shown by his own evidence. There
was no tender to A of part-one payment, but an intentional
withholding of same to compel the other party to perform;
and it is well that a party.who is himself in default, and with.out any offer to repair such default, cannot insist on performance by the other party as a condition precedent to his
performance. Spencer Med. Co. v. Hall, 78 Ark. 336; Dunham v. Pettee, 8 N. Y. 512.
SURETYSHIP.
In the case of French, Finch & Co. v. Hicks, 114 S. W.
691, a bond which upon its face called for three securities
P&,o Cond,- was only signed by two sureties and then delivtlons 0tsid
ered by obligor to obligee. At the trial the surethe Bond
ties proved a parol agreement between themselves
and the obligor that there were to be three sureties. The
obligee at the time the bond was delivered to him by obligor
had asked no questions about it nor did the obligor notify him
of the parol agreement with the sureties.
Held, that where the bond is perfect on its face the surety
cannot escape liability by proving a parol condition With the
obligor, but where the bond as in this case calls for three sureties and only two have signed the obligee had no right to
assume that the two had annexed their signatures without
condition and should have investigated.
"If there are names of persons appearing on the body of
the bond or names of persons erased from the body of the
bond, which erasure was visible to the obligee at the time of
delivery it is sufficient to put him on notice." Arkansas v.
Churchhill, 48 Ark. 426.
"It must not be supposed however that a surety is not
bound whenever names appear in the body of the instrument
which are not appended as signatures thereto, nor is there any
presumption raised that those who have signed imposed any
conditions that others should sign." Childs on Suretyship, 39.
See also People v. Stacey, 74 Cal. 373.
The general rule seems to be that the parol agreement must
be proved by the surety and in the absence of any express
notice, there must have been some stipulation in the instrument itself or some erasure which would lead a prudent man
to ask questions about the signatures oi the surcies.
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TRADE-MARKS.
The complainant and defendant were both in the business
of manufacturing ink, mucilage, etc. Complainant had registered as its trade-mark under the Act of FebruA
V
0, 1905, C 592, par. x, the single word "DayValid Trade.
narkas
Othrz
A
I,.. of Same

ids" in ordinary large type. Said word had been

in use by complainant and its predecessor for
more than ten years before the passage of the
Act. Complainant's custom was to place said
word at the top of its label, words indicating the character
of the goods, such as "Ink," "Paste," etc., in the middle of
its label, and its own name, "Thaddeus Davids Company, New
York" at or near the bottom of the label. The words on the'
defendant's label, as well as their arrangement, were the same
as on complainant's label with the exception that defendant's
name "Davids Manufacturing Company" in prominent type
was substituted for complainant's name. The name "Davids"
is the surname of the members of complainant's company
and of each of the defendants.
The Court held (i) that section 2 of the Act, providing
that nothing shall prevent the registration of any trade-mark
used by the appellant or his predecessor or assigns in commerce * * * for ten years next preceding the passage of
the Act, did not make a surname a valid trade-mark which did
not before constitute a valid trade-mark; (2) that since every
man is entitled to use his name reasonably and honestly in
every way, and cannot be obliged to abandon or ufireasonably
restrict such use, a family name is not the subject of a valid
trade-mark as against others of the same name. The Court
does not decide whether it would have been valid against persons of another name. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, et al.,
175 Fed. 792 (Circ. Ct. S. D. N. Y., 19o8).
This decision is not within those cases which hold that an
injunction will issue, defendant's use of his own name being
an unusual one in the trade [Royal Baking Powder Co. v.
Royal, 122 Fed. 337 (19o3)], or because defendant so used
his name in connection with other parts of complainant's trademark as to deceive the public, [Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb.
77 (1857)] ; but seems to show a disinclination on the part of
the courts to follow the decision in Baker v. Sanders, 8o Fed.
$89 (C. C. A., 1897), where the injunction issued to enjoin defendant or at defendant's option, decree to be modified to require the affixing upon every package sold, in type
as prominent as the title, of the statement that "W. H. Baker
is distinct from and has no connection with the old established
chocolate manufactory of Walter Baker & Company," the
complainant.
Name
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TRUSTS.
Testatrix in her will left a sum of money ix trust to be
put and kept at interest, and such interest to be annually
expended in the care of the family burial lot,
PZettoTake where she was to be buried.
Held: A perpeual
CareoffBrial
round

trust cannot be created to take care of a private
burial lot, unless'the
creation of such a trust is

authorized by statute. Mason v. Bloomington Library Asn,
(Ill.), 86 N. E. io44.
The law will not allow the creation of a perpetual trust
since it "would stop commerce and prevent the circulation of
property." Johnson v. Holifield, 79 Ala. 423. But charitable
trusts constitute an exception to this rule, since the public
has an interest in their objects. However here has been considerable difficulty in determining what is a charitable trust.
The prevailing opinion is that a charitable trust is one in favor
of a class, that could not be enforced by any individual of
that class. So it has universally been held that a trust like
that in the principal case is not a charitable one, and is therefore void under the rule against perpetuities. Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155; Bates v. Bates, T34 Mass. Iio.
In many states statutes have been enacted authorizing the
creation of such trusts. As a rule the trustee must be some
public official body, such as the town council.
Under such a statute in Rhode Island, it was recently decided that the trust was valid though the council refused to
accept the legacy, and the court declared itself unable to compel it to do so. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Town

Council of Warwick (R- I.), 71 At. 644.
UNFAIR TRADE COMPETITION.

The plaintiff, a proprietor of a lumber yard, refused to discharge a non-union laborer in his employ. The defendant, the
Building Trades Council, thereupon ordered out all
Boycotta:
The /'leaning
of Used
"Unfalr..
as
by
Labor U ..

union men in the plaintiff's employ, and notified

employers of union labor who dealt with the plain-

tiff that he had been "placed on the unfair list of
the Building Trades Council," and that "union
men cannot work for or handle any material furnished by said
Parkinson until further notice."
Held, that "unfair" as used by labor unions does not mean
that the employer is guilty of fraud or dishonesty, but merely
that he has refused to comply with the conditions upon which
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union men will consent to remain in his employ or handle materials produced by him; that therefore the defendant was employing lawful means to obtain a lawful end and an injunction
should be refused. Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 98
Pac. io27.
In construing the meaning of any word it is always necessary to pay especial regard to the circumstances under which
it was uttered. Thus, as was pointed out in Gray v. Building
Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171 (i9o3), whether a notification

that an employer is "unfair" "would in any case amount to a
threat or intimidation must be determined from all the facts
and circumstances of each particular case." In the case under
discussion the construction of the word "unfair" seems sound;
but even if the court had read into it a more radical meaning
the result woud probably have been the same as other passages
of the notice doubtless contained moral intimidation. The
court, however, adopts the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in
Vegclahn v. Gunthcr, 167 Mass. 92 (1896), that harm may be
intentionally inflicted in free competition "by the withdrawal,
or threat to withdraw, such advantages from third persons who
have a right to deal or not to deal with the plaintiff, as a means
of inducing them not to deal with him, either as customers or
servants," thus bringing California in line with New York and
other jurisdictions which refuse an injunction against a boycott by moral intimidation. Cf. Sinshein:er v. United Garment
Workers, 77 Hun, 215; National 'Protective Ass'n v. CumWnings, x7o N. Y. 320; Fosterv. Protective Ass'n, 78 N. Y. S.

860.

